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RECENT DECISIONS
as they existed before." 7 The intrinsic quality of a stock dividend
is that of an increment to principal, though at times in furtherance
of intention,-they have been regarded as income. In the instant
case the trustee was privileged to treat them as capital.
As to allocations of stock dividends under trusts created in 1922
or later there is no question, the legislature having then declared the
addition of stock dividends
to the principal of a trust shall not be
8
deemed an accumulation.

WOR-

EN'S COMPENSATION-MASTER AND SERVANT-PRESER-

PEACE.-An employee of defendant, while driving
one of its cabs, was ordered by a policeman who jumped on the
running-board, to chase another car. He complied and while pursuing the other car, collided with a trolley sustaining injuries resulting
in his death. In an appeal by defendant from an order of the
Appellate Division sustaining an award of the State Industrial
Board, Held, order affirmed. Matter of Babington v. Yellow Taxi
Corp., 250 N. Y. 14 (1928).
VATION OF PUBLIC

The chauffeur could not lawfully refuse to obey the police
officer's command, since to do so would be a violation of the Penal
Law.1 The employer itself would be bound to comply, therefore,
Babington, its employee, charged with control of the car for and on
its behalf had to respond. Even assuming that he was not obliged
to heed the officer's authority, his use of the car was not an abandonment of his employment.2 Kellogg, I., dissenting, claims that in
aiding the police department, he became a member of that body,
subject to supervision of the officer and that he ceased to be a servant
of defendant.3 But the general employer is liable even though the
injuries were sustained at the time he was working under the direction of a special employee.4 He may look to one or both for
compensation. 5
'Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162, 189 (1883).
'Personal Property, Secs. 10 and 17A.
'Sec. 1848.
2
Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97 (1921).
Supra 250 N. Y. 14 at p. 20 citing Monterey County v. Rader, 199 Cal.
221 (1926); Village of West Salem v. Industrial Comm., 162 Wis. 57 (1916).
'Matter of Dale v. Saunders Bros., 218 N. Y. 59, 112 N. E. 571 (1916).
'Matter of De Noyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N. Y. 273, 116 N. E. 992 (1917).

